



FOR A METAPHYSICS OF DEIXIS: ABOUT THE RESURRECTION ON THE PAST IN THE LINGUISTIC LIFE OF DEIXIS

*POR UMA METAFÍSICA DA DÊIXIS: SOBRE A RESSURREIÇÃO DO PASSADO NA VIDA
LINGUÍSTICA DA DÊIXIS*

*PARA UNA METAFÍSICA DE LA DEIXIS: SOBRE LA RESURRECCIÓN DEL PASADO EN
LA VIDA LINGUÍSTICA DE LA DEIXIS*

Caio César Costa Santos

E-mail: cesarinmind@gmail.com

Universidade Federal de Sergipe - UFS

ABSTRACT

Why to entitle an paper: “For a metaphysics of deixis”? First, because Bühler's theory of the spirit about deixis or “Bühler's ghost” itself means the world of virtualities which is created fantastically (an aspect which Bühler did not explain in detail) and, second, because the term “metaphysics” originally indicates a new way of dealing with the phenomenon little observed in the deixis which is the resurrection of the past in our indicial lives. I as soon as I point to something, I, at the same time, am leaving behind a life, a life which is indicial, full of signifiers, of which I cannot neglect them. With this act, I have already created a range of images in my mind regarding the apprehension of the object, with perception, I act, point, and speak. Already within the act of perceiving the object, before I even point to it, a series of coalescing images has already been created in my mind. The fundamental problem presented here is that it is not possible to think about existence without memory, just as it is not possible to think about the act of pointing (the deixis) without a retrospection of the past. Contrary to Benveniste's (1989) perspective, that the *Origo* is the only deictic point and center of all linguistic relations, in this article, I aim to suggest that readers think of the past tense, the Aorist (in Benveniste's designation) as the origin of all deictic formulations. In this sense, the genuine interpretation of deixis must first consider the origin of the deictic center which is the past and later the present itself. The methodology used is critical-reflective.

KEYWORDS: Deixis. Past. Resurrection. Images. Spirit.

RESUMO

Por que intitular um artigo: “Por uma metafísica da dêixis”? Primeiro, porque a teoria do espírito de Bühler sobre a dêixis ou o “fantasma de Bühler” em si significa o mundo das virtualidades que é criado fantásticamente (um aspecto que Bühler não explicou em detalhes) e, segundo, porque o termo “metafísica” originalmente indica um novo modo de lidar com o fenômeno pouco observado na dêixis que é a ressurreição do passado em nossas vidas indiciais. Eu, assim que aponto para algo, estou, ao mesmo tempo, deixando para trás uma vida, uma vida que é indicial, cheia de significantes, da qual não posso negligenciá-los. Com este ato, eu já criei uma gama de imagens em minha mente a respeito da apreensão do objeto, com a percepção, eu ajo, aponto e falo. Já no ato de perceber o objeto, antes mesmo de apontá-lo, uma série de imagens coalescentes já foi criada em minha mente. O problema fundamental que se apresenta aqui é que não é possível pensar a existência sem memória, assim como não é possível pensar o ato de apontar (a dêixis) sem uma retrospecção do passado. Ao contrário da perspectiva de Benveniste (1989), de que o *Origo* é o único ponto dêitico e centro de todas as relações linguísticas, neste artigo, procuro sugerir que os leitores pensem no passado, o Aoristo (na designação de Benveniste) como a origem de todas as formulações dêiticas. Neste sentido, a genuína interpretação da dêixis deve considerar primeiro a origem do centro dêitico que é o passado e posteriormente o próprio presente. A metodologia utilizada é crítico-reflexiva.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Dêixis. Passado. Ressurreição. Imagens. Espírito.

RESUMEN

¿Por qué titular un artículo: “Por una metafísica de la deixis”? Primero, porque la teoría del espíritu de Bühler sobre la deixis o "el fantasma de Bühler" en sí mismo significa el mundo de virtualidades que se crea fantásticamente (un aspecto que Bühler no explicó en detalle) y segundo, porque el término "metafísica" originalmente indica una nueva forma de se trata del fenómeno poco observado en la deixis que es la resurrección del pasado en nuestras vidas indiciales. Yo, en cuanto señalo algo, estoy, al mismo tiempo, dejando atrás una vida, una vida indicial, llena de significantes, de los que no puedo descuidarlos. Con este acto, ya he creado un abanico de imágenes en mi mente sobre la aprehensión del objeto, con la percepción, actúo, señalo y hablo. Ya en el acto de percibir el objeto, incluso antes de señalarlo, ya se creaba en mi mente una serie de imágenes fusionadas. El problema fundamental que surge aquí es que no es posible pensar en la existencia sin memoria, así como no es posible pensar en el acto de señalar (la deixis) sin una retrosección del pasado. Contrariamente a la perspectiva de Benveniste (1989) de que el Origo es el único punto y centro deíctico de todas las relaciones lingüísticas, en este artículo, busco sugerir que los lectores piensen en el tiempo pasado, el Aoristo (en la designación de Benveniste) como el origen de todas las formulaciones deícticas. En este sentido, la interpretación genuina de la deixis debe considerar primero el origen del centro deíctico que es el pasado y luego después el presente mismo. La metodología utilizada es crítico-reflexiva.

PALABRAS-CLAVE: Deixis. Pasado. Resurrección. Imágenes. Espíritu.

INTRODUCTION

Shadow? Deixis? Past? Ghost? At first, these designative terms do not seem to be conjoined with each other. After all, what do they have in common? It is precisely the initial purpose of this article: to try to draw an argumentative line around the *sensitive apprehension* of the deictic component. Many linguistic literatures, ancient and modern, have found *few margins* to deal with the phenomenon of deixis, precisely because these scholars have not dealt with the problem *in loco*. They have been sketching things as: i) the deixis is the linguistic sign quintessentially. ii) the deixis absolutely needs the context. iii) deixis works with the notions of person, time, and space. iv) the deixis is a referential linguistic category. v) the deixis is the showing or pointing to something, either human or animal actant. Well, these are the most common thoughts we find in the current literature on the topic. But are these points around the deixis crucial to understanding the phenomenon completely or, at least, situating it within an essentially epistemological approach?

Conceiving the deixis within a strong epistemological treatment requires from the scholar or researcher a broad “territorialization” of the problem in question. In other words, it is necessary, in view of this linguistic object, a broad “mapping” of all the epistemological conditions which are circumscribed to this process or “deictic task”. It is also necessary, It’s necessary a new term, a “deictic objective”. In this regard, I want to say that my proposal for a foundation around this linguistic object aims to circumvent all the epistemic fields of deixis at once, if this is possible. A “said” research on deixis is not restricted to its stylistic, aesthetic, or referential value, only. The scope of this study here is made and remade through a prism, let's say, “innovative”, not yet evident in the scientific encyclopedia. If my memory and my efforts

do not fail me, I have been focusing on the study of deixis for almost a decade now, at the beginning of my master's degree. Not satisfied with the "research" on current deixis, I decided to write an article which is original in terms of sensitivity to this phenomenon. I believe that I am in a big field of dynamite, but I will try, as much as possible, to avoid "superficiality", inaccuracies, and discrepancies.

The epistemological problem begins when a good number of scholars (Bar-Hillel (1982), Benveniste (1989), Fillmore (1971), Lahud (1979), Levinson (2007), Lyons (1977), among others.) have a very limited perception of deixis. I never want to deny the merit of these great scholars who revolutionized the field of Linguistics, but I just want to highlight that the three-dimensional view of the "deixis" problem was not conceived until then. Perhaps they have lacked epistemic ties with other sciences which are not necessarily pertaining to language. Bar-Hillel (1982) tried, with the studies of "indicative expressions", to show that the contextual component is essential for the interpretation of the deixis. Benveniste (1989) took a more subjective look and demonstrated that the deixis is not deixis without the categories of person, time, and space (the "I-here-now"). Fillmore (1971) launched his argument around the "limits" of the deictic system, covering only the potential forms within this system alone. Lahud (1979) tried to delineate a proper epistemology of deixis, trying to differentiate artificial language from natural language. Levinson (2007) subdivided deixis into three main categories (personal, spatial, and temporal), something which Benveniste had already done. Lyons (1977) witnessed the study of deixis within a purely semantic model, after all, he was one of the greatest semanticists. Finally, the "deictic universe" of these authors borders on a *stricto sensu* formatting or systematization of eminently linguistic categories which reveal no more than the "artificial" character, very evident and circumscribed to a whole of the system. In a nutshell, between the 60s, 70s, and 80s, the conglomeration of linguistic theories about the deixis was nothing more than a "grammaticalized" study, decidedly formal and empirical.

Against this "deictic universe" of the previous century, where the roots of a "deictic structuralism" germinated, I come, then, to problematize the various instances, physical and even psychic, which were for a long time hidden in the dark depths of an old basement. I intend to open this *forgotten* environment and remove the dust which was crystallized with oblivion. I also aim to "give a new face", clean and "paint" the new object with various colors which will, after its existence is clarified, be placed in a new place, on a new shelf so that everyone can observe it in the set of its outline, being possible to see it in its many facets, in the amazing threshold of its potential structure; free, genuine, and transcendental. I want, therefore, to *recover* this forgotten object in the understanding of its greatness, to put it back in the spotlight, to make it alive once more, so that it can still be the object of many, many other researches. This object is the deictics. I ask that the hasty reader has allowed me these metaphors, because only in this way is it possible to make the deictic object par excellence more concrete, closer to us, in short, more intelligible. Not that the classical authors have not given the necessary importance, but that, in particular, I intend, with this text, to recover all possible sensitive potential instances of the "deictic universe". Because it is actually a universe, we'll see why.

Another problem at hand is that, for example, Bühler (1967), one of the greatest if not the greatest references to the date on deixis, managed to dissect a good part of the potential sensitive forms of deixis, but not all of them. With this so-called “dissection”, first, it was Bühler (1967) who evoked the Greeks saying that they were the first peoples to have more or less knowledge of what the deictic phenomenon would be, as the Greek soldiers, in upright march and in the shape of In sense, they made signs to other soldiers in the form of greetings, pointing to each other, forming imaginary lines with their fingers, arms and hands. For more details on this particular approach and in a more developed way, see Santos (2020a). Second, Bühler (1967) brought to literature the notion of “deictics field” which was later remodeled by Hanks (2008) and that I even wrote a dissertation on the topic in Santos (2014). Third point: Bühler (1967) divided this “field” into “symbolic field” and “mostrative field”, something which has never been done by any linguist. Fourth point: Bühler (1967) also brought, in addition to personal, temporal and spatial deictics (classification made by Benveniste), the deixis of the spirit, the so-called “deixis am phantasma”. On this last type of deixis, I also have a text published in Santos (2020b). Anyway, it was precise with this thought and action of Bühler to bring deixis to the spiritual field which the idea of writing an article to develop a little more about this topic, which is to some extent metaphysical, came up. Buhler's advice (if we can put it that way) is that we should see the deixis not only with the eyes of the body but also with the eyes of the spirit. Starting from this particular vision, we started to enter a new “terrain”, not seen or sketched before. That's why I titled this article “For a metaphysics of deixis” for two reasons. First, Bühler's theory of the spirit about deixis or “Bühler's ghost” itself means the world of virtualities which is created fantastically (an aspect which Bühler did not explain in detail) and, second, because the term “metaphysics” originally indicates a new way of dealing with the phenomenon little observed in the deixis which is the resurrection of the past in our indicial lives. What do I mean by this? That precisely our past is also the object of analysis in the deixis. No linguist, as far as I know, has incorporated the past into deictic expressions in a metaphysical way. If the reader thinks that an interpretive picture of the deixis in the past is impossible, I invite you to read the following pages.

Past: origin of present deictics formulations

In this topic, I want to defend that it is in the past that the deictic actions of the present are hidden. For this, the reader will have to have a succinct knowledge of Henri Bergson's philosophy. Bergson demonstrated that the present tense only exists because of the coexistence of the past. They, the present and the past, are intimately linked, as is the soul with the body. Bergson (2010) in the book “Matter and Memory” deals with the relationship between the body and the spirit. According to Bergson (2010, p. 6), “the memory - as we will try to show in this work - represents precisely the intersection point between spirit and matter”. In other words, there is no way to think about a sensory or motor movement fixed on Earth, without considering the present point and the previous point. The individual's own existential constitution calls for the existence of the present which is contemporary with the past; the present “asks permission”

from the past to exist and progress. There is no present without a past, just as there is no past without a present. Everything is interconnected. The study of deixis cannot take place in a rectilinear space, as the individual's horizon must precisely widen, expand. For example, I am currently pointing to my pen. This simple act of locomotion and motor movement in space takes place in the now of enunciation. No one should disagree. But what about the story behind that pen? What reason exactly led me to choose that pen at that exact moment? What is my sensitive experience with that pen? What's behind this at first sight simple-minded and natural movement? What traces are hidden there? This allows the reader to realize that, behind every act of recalling something, there coexists and crystallizes a point of intersection between the past which was and the present which already is. This example is very ephemeral, but as the text progresses, you may agree or disagree with me.

It is with Bergson whom I return to my argument, he says: "what does this mean, but that my perception traces precisely in the set of images, like a shadow or a reflection, the virtual or possible actions of my body?" (BERGSON, 2010, p. 16). Behind all perception there is not in it, but in duration, a dispersed and heterogeneous agglomeration of images. Perception is within and without the individual. Perception is not seen, only perceived. An object is changed and its relationship with my body is modified, but also with my interiority. The act of deixis comes from the outside, which is, through the fingers, hands, torso, or face, but for everything which comes from the outside, there is an interior portion. If I as soon as I point to something, I, at the same time, am leaving behind a life, a life which is indicial, full of signifiers, of which I cannot neglect them. Perception forms and unforms. "Forms" in the mechanical act of perceiving and "deforms" in the recursive act of the incessant process of construction of images which are interpolated right after the act of perceiving. The logic behind the act of perceiving is evident: point, retreat, retreat, point. Bergson (2010, p. 21) says: "we only apprehend things in the form of images, it is in terms of images, and only images, which we must pose the problem". Which is, at the very moment of the act of perceiving, I have already created a range of images in my mind regarding the apprehension of the object, with perception, I act, point, and speak. Already within the act of perceiving the object, before I even point to it, a series of coalescing images has already been created in my mind. It is at this first point of my argument that the deixis which comes from the spirit must fit. There is no image built without the act of perceiving, whether motor or sensory, just as there is no perception without a prior and interior construction of images. And, of course, the deixis is purely an act of perception.

In our view, motor perception has immediate and present material space (such as remissive acts with fingers, hands, and trunk) and deixis (spiritual in nature) has mental images incessantly constructed with the act of perceiving the object. The evocation of the past comes close to a phantasmagoria because: how to think about the act of perceiving without being inscribed in the episodic history, obscure or not, of a recent or distant past? The logic is clear: how to perceive perceiving without thinking? We make it clear, therefore, that thought, memory, the past is connected in the entire remissive flow of pointing with fingers, hands, or face. It is not possible to think about existence without memory, just as it is not possible to think about the act of pointing (the deixis) without a retrospection of the past. Deixis is nothing more

than a conscious awareness of the act of pointing, and of course we know that behind every conscious experience or perception there are point A and point B, inside and outside, inside, and outside, the side and the reverse, the obscure and the sharp, the old and the new, etc. Perception only becomes “complete” with the flow of the whole, with the dynamic side of the thing.

Our perspective becomes unique because we relate the flow of the body to the flow of the spirit. And then our vision reaches a decisive point - I quote Bergson again (2010, p. 30. emphasis added) - “actually, *there is no perception which is not impregnated with memories*. To the immediate and present data of our senses we mix thousands of details from our past experience”. Given this thought of Bergson, it is clear why to think of an epistemological framework for the deixis (of a spiritual nature). The lay reader may raise the following question: is it possible to perform the deictic act mentally? The answer is yes. As Bergson tells us: perception itself is imbued with memories. Thus, showing, pointing, demonstrating is impregnated with signs which *contract* the real. This argument of “contracting the real” is very valuable for our studies, because if every act of pointing is an act of perceiving, this act of perceiving does nothing more than contracting the real, expanding it, expanding the horizon of possibilities of perspectives. It is as if every act of pointing with your fingers creates an imaginary line impregnated with signs which are even invisible to the naked eye. We know that sensitive dynamics happens, but we cannot “see” the ghosts which are contracted from reality.

By contracting the real, the memory impregnated in the perception, “approaches” and “distances itself” from the real, in a movement sometimes retrospective, sometimes immediate. The memory lives on. And the living being of memory is the invisible “mist” which settles in the present, in a retrospective, coming and going, uninterrupted movement, and this “mist”, obscure by nature, only becomes discernible with the sensory-motor contact of perception. The memory is, therefore, the living being who lives in the past, but who survives in the action of the present. I notice and, in an infinitesimal instant, I remember. Also working in reverse: I remember to then realize. The conscious experience of pointing something at someone also lives and survives on memories. The memory is, therefore, your food. The common deixis, the one that all linguists report in linguistic textbooks, lives and dies in the present, there is not even a way to recover a previously hidden portion embedded in deictic expressions. And if there is, these famous linguists did not give care. Time passed, and the deixis or the “deictic product” ended up in the eternal instance of the present, as is the linguistic approach of Benveniste. In one of his essays, Benveniste even proposed, I say, unconsciously, that there would be a certain “spatial-temporal translocation” of the deictic categories. But it was up to us to interpret this possible “translocation”. In a study also authored by me in Santos (2019), I wrote a little about what this “spatial-temporal translocation” process would be.

Contrary to Benveniste's (1989) perspective, that the *Origo* is the only deictic point and center of all linguistic relations, I suggest to readers that they think of the past, the *Aoristo* (in Benveniste's designation) as the origin of all the deictic formulations. But why the past and not the present since the conscious awareness of the act of pointing takes place in the present? Dear readers, we need to understand one thing: *what is in the real has already been*

virtual. Everything which is present is past. The present is not, the present was, and the past was not, the past is. In other words, we cannot think of any deictic act without incorporating the past into the present. If linguists were to accept this position of mine, I would have to change almost completely the field of analysis of deixis. It would no longer be the instance of the present, but the instance of the past would be the trigger for deictic relations. Thinking about the virtual rather than the current. Our own world is a Big Image, matter passes through us as an image, even our brain is an image of the image of representation. So, there is no reason to think that the liveliness of the deictic act is only in a current perception, on the contrary, the origin or the *Origo* point must go back, it must therefore seek the roots of its "history" in the past, whether recent or not. The temporal force of the present is infinitely reascended with the powerful virtual force of the past. That is, the flow of thought is under no circumstances dissociated from the present instance, it lives with it, it is past-present-present-past. And Bergson (2010, p. 35) ends up as if concluding our thought by saying: "what is given is the totality of the images of the material world together with the totality of its interior elements".

To make my line of reasoning a little more concrete, let's look at some examples:

- (1) A traveler takes a subway and arrives at a known station. There, he mysteriously observes that there was a sanatorium right in front of the station and it no longer exists. On the spot, they built a police station where the rounds of passengers from that station are carried out. The traveler, at that moment, is talking to a passenger and tells him: "Here, right here, was the sanatorium in which my brother was interned".

At first glance, the reader will notice that there is nothing mysterious about this: a sanatorium where is now a police station. But let's take it easy! A reader or scholar who knows only the theory of the common deixis will soon say that we are dealing with a space deixis with the use of "here" and he will also say that the deictic center is the location of the station, only. However, we need to broaden our vision and reach the retrospective point of the statement itself. It is okay that the season is the same, it remains fixed in the same place, so you have to think that the deictic center would this be.

But, if we analyze it very deeply, we will see that this reader is mistaken, or rather, he is unaware of the potential sensitive forms of the deixis. Well, the traveler is physically accommodated in the aforementioned station and so far the geospatial scenario or environment does not change. But, when he enunciates: "here, right here was the sanatorium...", the true deictic center is no longer the station (fixed place), but the virtual image of that previous event which crystallized in his memory and that now it is present in the deictic act of pointing out and using the "here". There is, therefore, a way of resizing the spatial environment in which the traveler finds himself. The great image of that scene lived and now relived appears as an overwhelming and unavoidable presence. Upon realizing that is no longer the sanatorium, the traveler instantly recalls and creates in his mind a new image, a new scene. A scene which is no longer sensorimotor, nor spatial, but temporal. Interior temporality has this power to re-enclose and reinsert new contexts, new events, in human relationships. Which is to say that

when the virtual image of the sanatorium's lived scene is updated by the traveler's mind, it is as if the current and fixed surrounding geographic space evaporates and a new environment, or rather an original environment, enters the scene. "Original" in the sense of "origin".

The recalled scene superimposes the current scene. Thus, even for milliseconds, the present instance is no longer the cause or the germ which triggered the use of the spatial deictic "here", but the superposition of the great virtual image which extends into the traveler's past, springing from the memory of the old sanatorium site. The instance of the present now appears as a simple instantaneous passage which mysteriously disappears in the confrontation with the great virtual image of the episodic memory of remembering the sanatorium. Here, then, the present appears only as a given for existence, as a "thing" which makes the traveler belong to the real, only. On the other hand, it is the past which takes the royal course of the event. Here, Buhler's advice is justified: we must learn to see also with the eyes of the spirit. The ghost would be the illusory perception of the traveler believing that there, right there, existed a sanitarium. Then, all the forces, affective and temporal, take you to the origin of the deictic center which is pure and true. There is a kind of succinct "freezing" of the real to let go of the almost imperceptible softness of the past. Therefore, we can say that the deixis (of a spiritual nature) ends up as if *contracting* the real, leaving it more fluid, malleable and adherent. It is, therefore, in this way, we can see the real "functioning" almost completely of the deixis in its entirety.

Deep down, as we can see, there is a virtual perception of everything. For every object, there is an image, and this image is the original germ. Likewise, there are no deictic relations without the survival of images contemporary with the act. I need my present to exist, but I need my past to survive. For what passes by, noticing. If my physical body is for me an image which is also virtualized, what about the great images which survive in me of the world, both material and spiritual? The world is problematically a paradox: sometimes current, sometimes virtual. But for our purposes, a present which was is the past that is. Just as there is a union of body and soul, there is a union of past and present. They are inevitably united; they were gestated by the same placenta. That is why, for our analysis, it is difficult to distinguish them, to dissociate them, to be taken apart. And, once again, we agree with Bergson (2010, p. 63) when he tells us it "things are clarified, on the contrary, if we start from the representation itself, it is, from the totality of the perceived images". The same can be said of deictic relationships (of a spiritual nature). The act of pointing to an object in the mechanical perception of the present does not say much, on the contrary, it takes mental representation to *clarify* or *bring something to light*.

The past as a deictic center?

In another book by Bergson now, *Memory and Life*, he says: "We have no interest in listening to the uninterrupted rumble of deep life. And yet, the real duration is there" (BERGSON, 2006, p. 17). With this "buzz", Bergson wanted to show that our deepest selves usually have a "voice" or a certain noise which goes on throughout our lives incessantly and

we cannot make them stop. This, therefore, is the “noise” of our inner nature, the sound of the nature of our soul, or rather, of the deepest places in our memory. Because, for Bergson, soul equals memory. Even so, our memory is ours, it is part of the ontogenesis of man, however, memory is not in a gray matter like the brain, memory, however, is part of duration, it is duration itself. “Duration” means the various succinct time intervals of our psychological life. The surrounding or outside world has a duration which commands, extends, and spreads in the psychological life of any individual. It is as if the external world came with a cosmic composition of its own, but the duration of our psychological states remodels it, instantly reinserts new memory elements, corrupting the gross layer of the universe's duration. But what does duration have to do with deixis? Well, the duration of our psychological states is responsible for “digging” and finding, in the depths of our deepest self, the sensitively temporal elements which participate in our temporal interiority. Thus, each deictic relationship requires a certain *amount of sensitivity* from the individual. And, of all our senses, the visual field is the most common for this relationship.

In agreement with Merleau-Ponty (2018), we do not see objects exactly as they are. That is, we do not see an object in all its dimensions. This, to the limit of the human eye, is impossible. We have the impression of seeing and perceiving an object as a whole, with its geometry, but this is just an illusion. It is not that in order to notice I first have to see. No, that is not it. In the very act of noticing, I am already seeing. Our visual field ends up being also an obstacle to the true formation of the deictic element (what you really see because you are seeing). Even more, for the deixis (of a spiritual nature). If, for us, it is already a big problem to see with the eyes of the body, imagine with the eyes of the spirit. Of course, the spirit does not have an eye, it is just a metaphor. And if it did, the eye would be our soul, our memory. One thing is you see matter, another thing is you see memory. Both acts are possible, but of different natures. Seeing matter is a natural function of the human eye, but seeing memory is a function of the virtual duration of our interiority. As in the traveler's example, he did not see the sanatorium, seeing it. It seems to be a paradox; however, this is how it happens. There is no physical experience in relation to the sanatorium “seen” object, but the body of the physicality of the phenomenon itself reappears as a ghost. Therefore, it is to be thought that one is not seeing. The invitation to reflect on this episode did not come or appear out of nowhere. The environment itself was the trigger for evoking sensitive memory experiences with the “sanatorium” object.

Let's go to another example to emphasize:

- (2) A companion says to his wife from the room where they are: “darling, remember that carnival there in Rio where that symphony by Beethoven played?”

Seeing we are dealing here with instances of the past, remembered. Here we want to prove that every deictic center has its true origin, its Origo, in the past and not in the present as a good part of the linguists defended, including among them, Benveniste. First, the case is that, in this statement, there is no indication that it took place during a carnival period, as it is only

remembering a past event. Anyway, whether it is a time of carnival or not, the linguistic elements of our language, together with memory, have an affective power to “open” underground layers of discourse. In this example, initially, it is the very use of demonstrative deictic “that” which is responsible for opening this previously forgotten deep layer. Remember, the couple is inside the room and suddenly one of the partners has an *insight* and describes his memory about the carnival in Rio. Apparently, there is no physical trigger which triggers such a memory (an object, an attitude, an action). However, we do not know if there would be any psychic trigger because, for it, we would have to enter the individual's subjective interiority, we had to be him, to live, at least once, him, in him. In any case, interpretation is possible.

At first, it is the individual's retrospective memory which is triggered like a flash. And, at the moment of this appearance of retrospective memory, the present instance (the room's environment) is no longer part of the world created by the subject. And why is it no longer a part? Well, the moment you say, “remember that carnival...”, there is a dissolution of the present image in the past image. It is as if the couple only had the geographic space of the room as a support to see, to feel, in short, to exist. And now take the opening of a “new life”, with the carnival scene appearing. The physicality of the way of existing becomes just that of immediate awareness, that of seeing and perceiving objects and the unfolding of the scene inside the room. The fourth ends up being, in the first instance, an image no bigger than the experience relived in the individual's mind when remembering the carnival. At the exact moment when one thinks about remembering this scene which has already taken place, the present and immediate space of the room is in the background and the sensitive experience of remembering the carnival is invited to take its place. Therefore, the great image of this relived scene starts to determine the state of consciousness of the individual and, not only that, but also of the sensorimotor space. In a nutshell, it is as if the past “devoured” the instance of the present, making it disappear for at least a millisecond. Now, it is the memory of the relived event which takes the regal action of the event. Now yes, it is possible for the individual to guide and be guided by memory, spiritually.

At the exact moment when the past takes the form of the physical place, in a clear spiritual way, the enunciation starts to take place ghostly. Therefore, the deictic center is no longer the fixed point embedded in the space of the room, on the contrary, the deictic center becomes the scene, now current, of the carnival. Therefore, we can say that it is possible to *guide oneself* mentally, even without the immediate and spatial awareness of the place. For, as we know, with the recollection, it seems that we start to relive, to re-experience that situation again. In this case, the past is nothing but an idea, a contemplation, a wonder, while the present is nothing but an idea-motor. If it is possible to live in the past, why not act in the past as well? The entire image of the carnival lives beyond and without the presence or existence of the bedroom space. Given this, is it possible to think that the phenomena of the spirit would have an independent reality? The answer would be with Bergson (2010, p. 77) when he tells us that “memory needs to be, in principle, a power absolutely independent of matter”. What if matter were the matter of spirit? Could we *act* on remembrance of remembrance? This is the problem we are trying to solve here about the deixis (of a spiritual nature). I defend the idea

which when you are remembering a memory, you are at the same time reliving what happened. This with all the potential forms which reliving memory is entitled to. Reconnecting with the memory is the same as leaving the present for a given moment, it is restoring the psychic energies with the relived scene, it is self-knowledge, it is learning to readapt to a new life, even if it is purely virtual.

According to Bergson (2010), every perception extends into nascent action. What does this have to do with our purposes? That every virtual conscious state is born of perception. Perception is what triggers our mental representations. Without the germ of perception, there is no way to have memory and, consequently, virtuality. As in the previous example, the nascent perception arising from the use of the deictic “that carnival” makes a virtual image flourish which ends up dissociating from the present instance. It is not that the revived scene becomes present, it does not need this, because it is already there, evident, alive, united to the interiority of the being which does not cease to germinate new formations of virtual images. In this sense, an image tends to survive with the presence of another and many other images. As they dissociate, they also complement each other. And for every evocation of an image from the past it is necessary, as we said before, to leave or leave the present action and concentrate on the past action. About this, Bergson (2010, p. 90, emphasis added) says: “to evoke the past in the form of an image, it is necessary to be able to *abstract oneself* from the present action, it is necessary to know how to value the useless, it is necessary to want to dream. Perhaps only man is capable of such an effort”. This thought goes well around our perspective and leads us to believe that it is possible to act only through memories. For, as we have seen, the present is just a given instant of reality, one of the different ways of existing; it is, in addition to a passage, an ideo-motor principle which does nothing more than embed our body and organism in space.

Our real existence is restricted to the apprehension of “fixed” objects in space, while existence through virtual experience apprehends an unlimited number of objects infinitely greater than the cluster of real perception. And I stress again, the memory only arises once the perception is recognized. We do not defend the position which the instance of the present is something useless. No. It, however, appears to us only as a given of existing, which is, as a substantial way for me to be aware of existing in the world. Only that. The special case is for the past which, as we have seen, has all the potential to house the deictic coordinates of perception. As I indicated in the introduction, “Bühler's ghost” suggests metaphorically the insertion of the past as a proper epistemological category for deictic relations and that, incidentally, Bühler himself did not even suppose that it was possible to be guided by memories. Hence, the attempt to postulate and sketch an epistemological framework for the deixis (of a spiritual nature). As we have seen, deixis of this type removes from the individual's psychological life the sensitive elements necessary for the absorption of the virtual experience. “There comes a time when the memory thus reduced fits so well into the present perception that it is impossible to say where the perception ends, where the memory begins” (BERGSON, 2010, p. 121). Perception and memory are so fused that it is almost impossible to untie them from this fusion. Perception is already remembrance and remembrance is already

perception. It is not us humans who come to dissociate one from the other, no, it turns out that the natural flow of the two is so common that it goes unnoticed, it even becomes unconscious for us.

As far as deictic formulations are concerned, this supposed imbrication of perception with memory or vice versa is an unavoidable fact. Therefore, at the beginning of the analysis, the difficulty for us to untie the knot between the two and form a more or less coherent path with regard to the formation of the deictic component starting from the past. We saw that at times it is perception, at times the memory appears. The very use of demonstrative elements of our language seems to germinate a confusion of an epistemic order, not knowing clearly which way to find or by what sinuosity the double temporal flow points (sometimes past, now present). One of the only signs of when the perception of the real ends is when there is the appearance of a demonstrative particle or a tense in the *aorist* past: both can help us to travel the road which leads us to the dark interiority of the actant. With regard to deixis (of a spiritual nature), the present would not only be a motor idea as we said before, but, in addition, it *makes* memories *update* as they are crystallized. The synthesis of the process would be something like this: it is perceived, evoked, updated. With the given update of memories, they tend to survive longer in memory, starting to progress incessantly. The closer these memories come to real perception, the more they temporarily left their virtual state and continued to be updated at all times. We remind you that this process of updating memories is very succinct, sensitive, and imperceptible and those memories do not tend to live updated all the time, leaving their natural raw state. They, the memories, should only be updated with the intention of *reaching*, within their particular form, the real, or better, at the instance of the present. No more than that.

Let's go to the last example. I removed it from my dissertation defended in 2014. Here is an example:

(3) "Three days later, I saw that memory change before my eyes" (KOTRE, 1997. p. 74).

Realize again that this is a statement in past tense. But what happens is logicians, semanticists, or linguists of the text would interpret it structurally, unilaterally, without considering the potential forms of use. For them, the textual dynamic would correspond to a past action, which was crystallized, and the contextual component would be essential for the elucidation of the narrative. However, this is not the way we intend to interpret it. Let's see. Kotre, the enunciator, describes a phantasmal situation. Not that he saw supernatural beings. That is not it. For the wonder of what had happened must have caused him a surprise apprehension. He says, "I saw that memory shift before my eyes." We do not know which memory it is because there are not enough existing evidences. But what remains for us to know is where or how that given memory mysteriously appeared. See that the index of subjectivity "I saw" is coupled or integrated with that memory. Therefore, we are not dealing with an enunciation which occurs in the present instance, or rather, the given instant of the real present is just the individual's mode of existence, that is, the fact he has an immediate awareness of his

physical body embedded in the Earth. Furthermore, in this statement, it is the instance of the present which updates the memory which appeared three days later. Moreover, it is the potentiality of the virtual state of the event which complements the entire enunciation.

First, there is no evidence of any external object which has caused the memory to appear, to some abrupt extent. Simply, the memory appeared as a flash, in a mysterious way. The great image of memory seems to take the subjective interiority of Kotre, as well as of the whole space, even if it is in an instantaneous way. It is evident that Kotre's spirit ends up changing in the face of the haunting memory (“changes before my eyes”). So, at this moment, for me, this would be the deictic center par excellence of the utterance: the opening of the underground layer of the discourse which ends up as if extending the past into the present action and determining the temporal flow starting from the virtual state of the image of that memory. Such a memory appears as a ghost, as something unexpected and without giving space to Kotre's judgment. Without forgetting also that the memory ends up being confused with the real perception. That is, it, the memory, takes the place of origin of perception, that is why, for a given moment, the deictic center is resized to the pure virtual state of that pure memory. Bergson (2010, p. 156) clarifies this point with the following words: “little by little appears like a cloudiness that condenses; from virtual it passes to the current state; and, as its contours are drawn and its surface colored, it tends to imitate perception”. It is like the illusory vision of a horse and that, little by little, as you get closer, you realize that it is no longer a picture of a horse, but two people sitting talking. Myopic visually impaired people often have this optical illusion. The same could be said of the memory which gradually tends to update itself. It leaves its nebulous and opaque state and transforms, with the action of real perception, into a translucent, living, nascent state.

Bergson (2010) has always told us that the progress of memory consists precisely in *materializing itself*. It is the same as saying when the individual goes into the dark background of an old basement and simply turns on the light. The luminosity represents the present action which does nothing more than undim and at the same time materialize the obscure memory. So much so that the set of memories when it appears to us is already “materialized”, although its black and impotent background (“the pure memory”) will remain black and impotent if the current image of the present does not superimpose itself on the virtual image born of pure memory. In other words, my present is what drives me to action while my past, without present action, remains impotent. One cannot survive without the other's existence. And, in deictic relationships, something similar happens. In the act of pointing, I have previously perceived the object and, in physical or psychic contact with such an object, the present action illuminates the past action, making it a living ghost who can act, without obstacles, in the immanence of my representation conscious mental. To sum up: the memory acts, but it does not act without the present action. It is, therefore, possible to *move* in an image field when, only if the virtual image *embodies* the body of the present instance. The past would be, for us, a nascent synthesis which does not cease to happen, to transform itself and, finally, to act, either under the surface of the present instance, or under images within images. And it is under these two forms that the deixis (of a spiritual nature) makes itself emerge.

CONCLUSION

What conclusion could be expected from a study that has been little formulated in the area of language sciences, as I have tried to present here in this article? It was a somewhat original perspective on his approach. We have seen that our linguist Bühler was the trigger for the philosophical, more than just linguistic, provocations that we have attempted to outline here. Bühler was responsible for giving the first impulse to introject, to the potentiality of the deictic system, the deixis (of a spiritual nature). And I had the honest pretense of developing, albeit at a slow pace, an approach to such a classification of type of deictic. For that, I had, therefore, to turn to Henri Bergson's philosophy of life and existence because this philosopher, in my view, was the closest to a very consistent defense about the survival of the past in our lives. Before writing this article, I had an *insight* which needed to be externalized to put it into practice: the *insight* was: it must be possible to *move* through a space filled with virtual images in a spiritual way. This was the hypothesis which guided me during these last years, studying the potential forms of deixis. I realized, in this course, that the deixis could be more, as I was deeply unhappy with the direction that this theory itself had taken in recent times. Therefore, I was invited to write an article and I decided to expose some of my ideas around this problem, which is, above all, of a philosophical nature.

Few people know that the deixis theory is much more of a philosophical problem than just a linguistic problem. Furthermore, more than linguistics, the theory of deixis is part of the field of Philosophy of Language. Perhaps this is why many scholars, who call themselves linguists, mistakenly think the deixis is a uniquely linguistic category, which cannot have access to other forms of knowledge. And this study in particular was concrete proof the deixis theory is much more complex than many people think. The innovative point of this study was that the deictic component is not always in the instance of the present; it can happen in the present, but it does not end there. We have seen, with some examples from everyday life, that the unity of the past also participates, almost entirely, in the process of constitution of deictic relations. For this, it was up to us to create a theory of knowledge around this phenomenon that, as it is exactly a “phenomenon” can be contained in almost all the elements which are restricted to human indicial life and why not even animal. Ordinary life itself is rich in examples, facts, situations which attest to the sensitive appearance of the deictic content. It is up to us, linguists, or philosophers of language, to look beyond the prism, to look beyond the surface and encounter the obscurity of its substrate. Many come and few come to the bottom. This is the problem. They do not see beyond, they are, however, limited to a motor, superficial and homogeneous state.

That with these reflections here, the reader can find many margins still, in order to further develop the theory in question. I was not the only one, nor will I be the only one who has thought or even planned a deeper development regarding the theory presented here. We are dealing with a “deictic universe” full of elements of language, environment, time, space, subjectivity, perception, senses, in short, the worlds - physical, psychic, and spiritual. The

lesson which is embedded in us humans is: we walk with the deixis, we grow old with the deixis, we sleep with the deixis and disappear from this world also with the deixis. Finally, we saw that it is possible to *orient yourself* not only physically, but also mentally and spiritually.

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